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approved the Principles of Corporate Governance at its annual meeting
in Washington. I
1. INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute ("ALl") is a unique institution. As one
writer describes it:
The ALl is perhaps the most elite group of lawyers in the United
States. Selected from the ranks ofdistinguished scholars and practitio-
ners, the Institute is best known for drafting "Restatements of the
Law" in various areas. These Restatements provide lawyers and
judges with carefully formulated descriptions of the law and tradition-
ally have served as authoritative guides for both legal briefs and
judicial opinions,"
Admission to membership in the ALl is by election, and the debates
on the various works the Institute produces are most often scholarly, if
not ponderous. The Project on Corporate Governance was different.
"The final approval of the American Law Institute's Principles of
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations represents
the culmination of the most controversial event in the history of
American corporate law." This has surely been the most contentious
project in which the ALl has ever engaged. The debates, including
numerous lengthy written analyses of various drafts as well as the
discussions on the floor of the ALl's Annual Meetings, where the actual
voting occurs, were uncharacteristic; they were sometimes angry in tone,
and some speakers went so far as to question the motives of the ALl in
undertaking the Project, while officials of the Institute felt it necessary
to defend their work. "Attendance at ALl meetings discussing corporate
governance issues tripled as a result of the controversy surrounding the
Project.:"
The very need for such a project was questioned almost continuously,
from the Project's formal initiation in 1978, to its publication in final
form in 1994. The criticism of the work over the years, as successive
1. Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1993) (footnote omitted).
2. Id. at 1216.
3. William J. Carney, The ALl's Corporate Governance Project: The Death of Property
Rights?, 61 GEO.WASH.L. REV.898, 898 (1993) (footnotes omitted). For a favorable review
ofthe finished product, see John T. Subak, This Baby Was Worth The Wait, Bus.L. TODAY,
Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 58.
4. Macey, supra note 1, at 1232 (footnote omitted).
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tentative drafts were published, has been "harsh and varied.:" The
attacks have come from a variety of sources, ranging from the Business
Roundtable" to liberal scholars, one of whom labelled the Project "A
Sheep in Wolf's Clothing."?
Over the life of the Project" there have been numerous law review
articles and position papers published; symposia have appeared
examining and criticizing various parts of the Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations ("Principles") from different
and often conflicting perspectives." A special committee of the American
Bar Association's Section of Business Law was created to monitor the
Project; it evolved into a group which worked closely with the Reporters
on the Project, another novel arrangement for the ALL10 And once
drafts were presented to the ALl membership for debate, intense
lobbying efforts, unparalled in ALl experience, were reported in attempts
to influence the votes of members on portions of this Project. This
culminated in the especially heated debate on the section on shareholder
derivative suits." There were rumors and allegations that corporations
were trying to protect their interests both by hiring members of the ALl
to represent their interests in that body's deliberations and by firing law
5. Kathryn N. Fine, Project, The Corporate Governance Debate and the ALl Proposals:
Reform or Restatement?, 40 VAND.L. REV.693, 695 (1987).
6. See, e.g., Edmund T. Pratt Jr., NATIONALEGALCENTERFORTHEPUBLICINTEREST,
The ALl Corporate Governance Project: A Radical Cure for a Healthy Patient. Vol. 1, No.
1, (March 1, 1989) (Pratt was then Chairman of the Business Roundtable.).
7. Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles
of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO.WASH.L. REV.325, 328 (1987).
8. While it seems to many that this Project has taken longer than any other ALl work,
the Chief Reporter points out that this is not so:
Although formally initiated in 1978, the Corporate Governance Project really did
not begin in earnest until 1980, when a full complement ofReporters was in place,
so that the Project took approximately 12 years to complete. By way of
comparison, the Federal Securities Code took 12 years to complete, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts took 19 years, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws also took 19 years, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts took 21 years.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance, 48 BUS.
LAW.1271, 1271 n. 1 (1993).
9. See, e.g., Symposium on Corporate Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 1267 (1993);
Symposium on Corporate Governance, 8 CARDOZOL. REV.657 (1987); Symposium: The
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO.WASH.L. REV.871
(1993). The last contains analyses of the Principles from perspectives as different as "law
and economics" and "law and literature." Symposium: The American Law Institute's
Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO.WASH.L. REV.871 (1993).
10. Elliott Goldstein, CORPRO: A Committee That Became an Institution, 48 Bus. LAW.
1333, 1334-35 (1993).
11. Macey, supra note 1, at 1223-24.
4 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
firms that strorigly supported the ALl's efforts to transform American
corporate law." Among the groups said to have "acted in various ways
to influence the ALl's deliberations" were the "American Corporate
Counsel Association, the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, the
Business Roundtable, and the National Association of Manufacturers.'?"
That such conduct would have occurred should not have been surprising,
given the strong likelihood that the Principles would have a powerful
impact for two reasons:
First, the extraordinary prestige enjoyed by the ALl would, by itself,
produce this outcome. Second, well before the Report had been
finalized, a number of courts had begun to cite even the most prelimi-
nary work of the Reporters as authoritative. Indeed, at least one court
cited as authoritative portions of the Principles that were later
abandoned by the ALl itself. 14
The leadership ofthe ALl, unaccustomed to this activity, reacted with
dismay and even outrage. 15 The meeting at which the final version of
the Project was approved was marked by repeated entreaties from the
presiding officer to ALl members to remember to vote their consciences
rather than the interests of their clients. Roswell Perkins, then-
president of the ALl and partner in the prestigious New York law firm
Debevoise & Plimpton, expressed his concern that the ALl not become
a '''forum for power plays by clients'" and told ALl members that "'the
precept of leaving one's client at the door must be honored if we are to
preserve our integrity as an organization.t'?" Such an appeal was
unprecedented in the history of this "elite" decision-making body.
Scholars accustomed to the usual drone of ALl proceedings remarked on
the different tone: "Consideration of the ... Project within the ALl
involved an apparently unprecedented amount oflobbying-type activities
by members from firms representing corporate management, a large
number of close votes at the plenary session, and extensive consideration
and reconsideration of many provisions.f'"
As noted above, even before the promulgation of the final version, the
Principles had been cited in court opinions, and had influenced the
thinking of the profession as reflected in legal journals. "Indeed, even
before the ALl formally approved the final report in 1992, courts in nine
12. Id. at 1229.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1230 (footnotes omitted).
15. Id. at 1229.
16. Id. (footnote omitted).
17. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS, CASES AND MATERIALS 201 (5th ed. 1994).
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jurisdictions had adopted the pronouncements in the tentative drafts as
law.?" Given the history of the "enormous influence" which the ALl
has had in the past," it is to be expected that the Principles will play
a significant role in the development of the law in this area.
The Principles do not "cover all of corporate law, but only a limited
number of selected topics .... "20 These are dealt with in Introductory
Notes, rules of law, recommendations of corporate practice and the
Comments thereto, which represent the Institute's position, and the
Reporter's Notes, which reflect his views." The president of the ALl,
in explaining why the term "Principles" was chosen for this work,
describes its range:
The term "Principles" in the title of the Project was not intended to
denote a level of treatment different from that found in traditional ALl
Restatements or in an ALl project such as the Federal Securities Code.
The term was not an expression of a purpose to deal in generalities.
It was intended, rather, to signify that neither a model state corpora-
tion law nor a new Federal corporation law would be drafted. The
Project was to focus on issues of governance responsibilities and to
state existing or recommended ground rules-some to be implemented
by the courts, some by legislatures, and some by corporations them-
selves."
Corporation law is state-based law. Georgia corporations are
governed, in the first instance, by the Georgia Business Corporation
Code." Because the ALl Principles are expected to have a significant
impact on the thinking of courts, lawyers, and scholars in this area, it
is important to understand how they compare to present Georgia law.
What follows is a comparison of the ALl Principles with Georgia law,
principally the Georgia Business Corporation Code, and relevant case
law. References to selected journal articles are included as well. Parts
I-VI of the ALl's Principles will be covered in this Article; Part VII,
Remedies, will be covered in the second part of this Article, to be
published in the Georgia Survey next year.
18. Macey, supra note 1, at 1216 (footnote omitted).
19. JOEL SELIGMAN, INVESTORRESPONSIBILITYRESEARCHCENTER, AN ANALYSISOFTHE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S CORPORATEGOVERNANCEPROJECT 13 (1986); see also Martha
Middleton, The ALl's Bitter Battle Ouer Corporate Law, NAT'L L.J., June 10, 1985, at 1.
20. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Chief Reporter's Foreward to 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATEGOVERNANCE: ANALYSISANDRECOMMENDATIONSat xxv (1994).
21. [d.
22. Roswell B. Perkins, President's Foreword to 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONSat xx-xxi
(1994).
23. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-101 to -1703 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
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II. THE OBJECTIVE AND CONDUCT OF THE CORPORATION
Part II of the ALl's Principles addresses the corporation's objective.
The ALl Principles state that a corporation should have an "economic
objective.f" operating to increase corporate profits and shareholder
gains." Unlike the ALl Principles, the Georgia statutes do not
expressly establish an objective for the corporate entity. 26 Rather,
every corporation established under the Georgia Business Corporation
Code has the purpose of "engaging in any lawful business unless a more
limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.T" The
economic objective can be implied from the use of the term "business,"
as well as the existence of separate code provisions for nonprofit
corporations."
The ALl-mandated economic objective is tempered somewhat by
section 2.01(b), which allows the corporation to recognize legal and
ethical considerations as well as to devote reasonable resources to
philanthropic, educational, humanitarian, and public welfare purpos-
es.29 The Comments and Illustrations make clear that the "economic
objective" should be focused on long-run profitability and shareholder
gain rather than on merely extracting the greatest amount of profit out
of each transaction.i"
In 1989 the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A." or "Code")
was amended expressly to permit the consideration by the board of
directors of the interests of other constituencies; that is, constituencies
other than shareholders, such as employees, suppliers, and bondhold-
ers." This statute requires that a corporation "opt-in" to its provisions
by adopting such a clause in its articles of incorporation." However,
24. PRINCIPLESOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE:ANALYSISANDRECOMMENDATIONS§ 2.01
cmt. e (1994) [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLESJ.On § 2.01, see generally Donald E. Schwartz,
Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALl's Principles, 52 GEO.WASH.L.
REV.511 (1984). The ALl Principles apply only to "business corporations," and not to those
corporations which are "non-profit." ALl PRINCIPLES,supra § 2.01 cmt. d. The Georgia
Business Corporations Code applies "ltlo all corporations for profit" as well as to other
corporations where special provisions do not apply. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1701(a)(1) (1989).
25. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 2.01(a).
26. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-301 (1989).
27. Id.
28. Id. The Georgia Non-Profit Corporations Code allows a corporate purpose of "any
lawful activity" rather than any lawful business. Id.
29. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 2.01 cmt. e.
30. Id. § 2.01 cmt. f, iIlus. 1-6.
31. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (1989).
32. Id.; see also William E. Eason, Jr., Some Distinctive Features of the Georgia
Business Corporation Code, 28 GA. ST. B.J. 101, 105-06 (1991).
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these other constituencies are expressly denied standing to bring
derivative actions."
III. THE STRUCTUREOF THECORPORATION
In these sections, the ALl Principles recognize the need both for
flexibility in the structure of the management of a corporation, and a
system for insuring accountability to shareholders. 34 Part III of the
ALl Principles addresses the required corporate structure, while Part
III-A contains recommended practices." The provisions in these parts
are stated in one of three formulations: (1) based on the rules that a
well-instructed court would likely embrace; (2) recommendations
intended for voluntary adoption; and (3) recommendations for use as a
statutory provision."
A. Size
In an effort to distinguish among the needs of different sized
corporations, the Principles employ a three tier system of classifica-
tiori." The first tier consists of large publicly held corporations, defined
as having at least two thousand record holders of its equity securities
and one-hundred million dollars of total assets." The second tier
consists of smaller publicly held corporations, defined as having atleast
five-hundred record holders of equity securities and five million dollars
of total assets.i" The third tier acts as a residual classification." All
of the provisions in this Part apply to the first tier, all but a few to the
second tier, and only one, section 3.03, which deals with directors'
informational rights, applies to the third."
The a.c.G.A. does not establish a classification system based on the
size of a corporation; therefore, its provisions are applicable to all
business corporations regardless of size. The one exception is when a
corporation with fifty or fewer shareholders elects to become a statutory
33. O.C.G.A.§ 14-2-202(b)(5) (1989).





38. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 1.24.
39. Id. §§ 1.31, 1.35.
40. Id. Introductory Note to Parts III and III-A (Structure of the Corporation).
41. Id.
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close corporation and therefore is governed by the close corporation
statutes."
B. Management
Section 3.01 establishes the proposition that principal senior execu-
tives appointed by the board of directors are responsible for the
management of the corporation." A basic function of the board is to
select and oversee management, although section 3.02(b)(6) makes it
clear that the board may manage the business of the corporation
itself. 44 In performing its management duties, senior management is
subject to the functions and powers of the board under section 3.02,
discussed below, and is also governed by the "standard of the corpora-
tion" as defined in section 1.36.45
The O.C.G.A. states that "[a]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by
or under the authority of, and the business and affairs ofthe corporation
managed under the direction of, its board of directors .... "46 The
Comment to this section indicates that the flexible "by or under"
language was chosen in order to meet the needs of varying sizes of
corporations."
The Principles encourage a modern approach regarding a senior
executive's apparent authority in dealing with third parties." This
would recognize actions that are considered to be in the ordinary course
of business, but not extraordinary actions." The apparent authority of
senior managers discussed in the ALl Principles is virtually identical to
the position which is adopted through Georgia case law."
42. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-901 to -950 (1989).
43. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 3.01. Principal senior executive is defined to
include "the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, and accounting officers of a
corporation." Id. §§ 1.30, 1.27(a).
44. Id. § 3.02(b)(6).
45. Id. § 3.01 cmt. c. As the Comment to § 1.36 states, this term "is used to describe
rules of governance that are generated by voluntary corporate action, as contrasted with
rules imposed by law." Id. § 1.36 cmt. It is, thus, defined to mean "a valid certificate or
bylaw provision or board of directors or shareholder's resolution." Id. § 1.36.
46. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-801(b) (1989).
47. Id. § 14-2-801 cmt.
48. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, Reporter's Note to § 3.01.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g.,Holliday Constr. Co. v. Sandy Springs Assocs., 198 Ga. App. 20, 400 S.E.2d
380 (1990); see also Cooper v. G.E. Constr. Co., 116 Ga. App. 690, 158 S.E.2d 305 (1967)
(noting that, although the decision was based on grounds of the corporation's ratification
of its president's actions, the president has apparent authority to perform any acts in the
usual course of business).
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C. Board Functions and Powers
The Principles provide a list of five functions the board of directors
should perform." and a list of seven it may perform.52 The first list
is designed to establish the minimum functions of the board:
(1) Select, regularly evaluate, fix the compensation of, and, where
appropriate, replace the principal senior executives ... ;
(2) Oversee the conduct of the corporation's business to evaluate
whether the business is being properly managed;
(3) Review and, where appropriate, approve the corporation's
financial objectives and major corporate plans and actions;
(4) Review and, where appropriate, approve major changes in, and
determinations of other major questions of choice respecting, the
appropriate auditing and accounting principles and practices to be used
in the preparation of the corporation's financial statements;
(5) Perform such other functions as are prescribed by law, or
assigned to the board under a standard of the corporation .... 53
The functions contained in the second list are designed to allow for
flexibility in dealing with senior management:
(1) Initiate and adopt corporate plans, commitments, and actions;
(2) Initiate and adopt changes in accounting principles and practices;
(3) Provide advice and counsel to the principal senior executives;
(4) Instruct any committee, principal senior executive, or other
officer ... , and review the actions of any committee, principal senior
executive, or other officer;
(5) Make recommendations to shareholders;
(6) Manage the business of the corporation;
(7) Act as to all other corporate matters not requiring shareholder
approval. 54
This section also recognizes the board's ability to delegate authority to
its committees. 55
The O.C.G.A.contains a broad general statement that "[am corporate
powers" may be exercised by the board of directors; board powers may
be limited by the articles of incorporation, by the bylaws approved by the
shareholders, or by a shareholders agreement. 56 A Georgia corporation
51. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 3.02(a).
52. Id. § 3.02(b).
53. Id. § 3.02(a).
54. Id. § 3.02(b).
55. Id. § 3.02(c).
56. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-801 (1994).
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may dispense with a board of directors if it elects close corporation
status or a valid shareholder agreement so provides; of course, publicly
traded companies must comply with the rules of the market on which
their shares are traded. 57
The O.C.G.A., like the ALl Principles, provides for the delegation of
authority by a board to its committees. 58 Although the O.C.G.A. does
not enumerate the functions a board of directors must perform, specified
functions cannot be delegated to committees," and would, thus, have
to be performed by the board itself." The O.C.G.A. also makes no
attempt to enumerate functions that may be performed by the board.
Unlike the ALl Principles, which are "intended to make recommenda-
tions for corporate governance ... includ[ing] the general practice of
corporations and the management of their businesses.?" the Model
Business Corporation Act, upon which the Georgia Business Corporation
Code is based, focuses on enabling provisions more appropriate to a state
statute. 62
D. Board Rights to Information
The informational rights of the directors are addressed in section 3.03
of the ALl Principlesi" This section recognizes the right of every
director to inspect and copy all corporate documents, and to inspect
physical facilities at any reasonable time." A judicial remedy may be
sought if access to information is not granted, and should be withheld
only if the information requested is not reasonably related to the
performance of the director's functions or duties, or if the director
intends to utilize the information in a manner which violates his
fiduciary duty to the corporation." A court may include in its order
provisions to assure that compliance with the request for information is
not so expensive and burdensome as to disrupt business, and that the
57. [d. § 14-2-80lCa); ELLIOTTGoLDSTEIN,GEORGIACORPORATIONLAW& PRACTICE
§ 8.lCa) (1989).
58. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-825 (1989).
59. [d. § 14-2-825(d).
60. Except, of course, actions requiring shareholder approval, which the board can
neither personally perform nor delegate to a committee. [d.
6l. Elliott Goldstein, The Relationship Between the Model Business Corporation Act and
the Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, 52 GEO.WASH.
L. REV. 501, 507 (1984).
62. Goldstein, supra note 6l. The Georgia Business Corporations Code, adopted in
1989, is based on the 1984 Revised Model Business Corporations Act. William J. Carney,
Georgia's New Business Corporation Code, 24 GA. ST. B.J. 158, 158 (1988).
63. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 3.03.
64. [d. § 3.03(a).
65. [d. § 3.03(b)(1).
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director does not use the information to violate the director's fiduciary
duty to the corporation." If a director who is denied access to request-
ed information seeks the assistance of the courts, the corporation would
have the burden of proving the existence of a relevant exception.67
Neither the O.C.G.A. nor the Georgia courts have specifically
addressed the informational rights of directors. Shareholder rights to
information are restricted by statute to specified documents as well as
to information that is requested "in good faith and for a proper purpose
that is reasonably relevant to his legitimate interest as a sharehold-
er.,,68 If faced with the issue of a director's rights to information, a
court could reason in a manner parallel to the law on shareholder rights
and restrictions or, given statutory silence, a court might assume that
there are no restrictions, or fewer restrictions, on the informational
rights of directors."
E. Outside Experts
Section 3.04 of the ALl Principles recognizes the right of directors, at
the corporation's expense, to retain outside experts in order to gain
advice on problems related to their function." This resource is only
available to the directors who have no significant relationship with the
corporation's senior executives and who act as a group through a
majority vote." In addition, payment must be authorized by the full
board f or by a court upon application by directors without significant
relationships." The applying directors must have reasonably believed
that the retention of an expert was necessary in order to perform their
function properly, that the compensation paid to the expert was
reasonable, and that corporate experts would not have sufficed."
The O.C.G.A.does not specify whether directors have the authority to
retain outside experts, nor has the issue been addressed in case law."
66. Id. § 3.03(b)(3).
67. Id. § 3.03 cmt. c.
68. O.C.G.A. 14-2-1602(d)(1) (1989).
69. The Georgia Court ofAppeals has noted in dicta that "'shareholders have less right
to acquire corporate information than do directors.'" Riser v. Genuine Parts Co., 150 Ga.
App. 502, 504, 258 S.E.2d 184, 186 (1979) (quoting with approval Goldstein v. Lees, 120
Cal. Rptr. 253, 257 (Cal. App. 1975».
70. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 3.04.
71. Id. "Significant relationship" is defined in § 1.34 to include employment,
professional, or business ties. Id. § 1.34(a).
72. Id. § 3.04(a).
73. Id. § 3.04(b).
74. Id.
75. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-101 to -1703 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
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F Board Composition
The ALl Principles, in Part III-A, present recommendations regarding
the composition of the board of directors in publicly held corporations."
In the case of a large publicly held (first tier) corporation, the majority
of the directors should not have significant relationships with the senior
executives." Under the Principles, such a relationship exists if the
director is or was employed by the corporation within the last two years,
if a member of the director's immediate family is or was employed as a
senior executive within the last two years, or if a member of the
director's immediate family is presently an officer at any level. 78
Significant relationships with senior executives are also presumed to
exist if the director has paid to, or received from, the corporation a
commercial payment of over two-hundred thousand dollars," or if the
director is the principal manager of a business organization that has
paid to, or received from, the corporation a commercial payment of over
two-hundred thousand dollars or five percent of the organization's gross
annual revenue." A significant relationship with senior executives is
also presumed to exist if the director is, or was in the past two years, an
attorney affiliated with a law firm that was the corporation's primary
counsel for general corporate or securities law matters, or if the director
is, or was in the past two years, an investment banker affiliated with a
firm that advised the corporation or that acted as managing underwriter
for an issue of the corporation's securities." When the presumed
significant relationship arises from a commercial payment or from an
attorney or investment banker relationship, the presumption is overcome
if under the circumstances, it cannot be reasonably believed that the
relationship would adversely affect the corporation.V
76. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 3A.01.
77. Id. § 3A.01(a).
78. Id. § 1.34(a)(l)-(2). "Senior executive" is defined to include the chief executive; the
officers responsible for operating, financial, legal, and accounting matters; the chairman
of the board; the president; the treasurer; the secretary; and vice-presidents or vice-
chairmen who are in charge ofmajor business divisions or functions or who perform major
policymaking. Id. §§ 1.33, 1.27.
79. Id. § 1.34(a)(3). The payment can be personal, through a corporation the director
owns (or partially owns, but then the money is prorated so that the director's portion must
exceed $200,000). Id.
80. Id. § 1.34(a)(4).
81. Id. § 1.34(a)(5).
82. Id. § 1.34(b).
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The Comment to this definitional section makes clear that it is
applicable only to the provisions in Parts III and III-A, which deal with
the structure of the corporation, and that it
is not synonymous with the definition of "interested" in section 1.23.
Thus a director who has a significant relationship with the senior
executives under section 1.34 may nevertheless be disinterested with
respect to a particular transaction for purposes of Part IV (Duty of
Care and the Business Judgment Rule), Part V (Duty ofFair Dealing),
and Part VI (Role of Directors and Shareholders in Transactions in
Control and Tender Offers).83
The Comment goes on to explain that the crucial distinction is
between "directors who have a significant economic or professional
relationship with the senior executives, and directors who do not.,,84
This is different from the more traditional distinction that is made
between "inside" and "outside" directors. The purpose of this distinction
is to ensure that the board of a publicly held corporation, and its
essential committees, may perform its functions unaffected by factors
based on relationships with the members that might inhibit their
objectivity.85
If a single person, control group, or family owns a majority of the stock
of a first tier corporation, the Principles do not suggest that a majority
of directors be free of significant relationships." In these situations,
and for all second tier corporations, it is recommended that at least three
directors be free of significant relationships with the senior execu-
tives." It is suggested that this will ensure an objective analysis of
managerial performance."
The O.C.G.A. does not contain recommendations regarding the
composition of the board of directors, with the exception of section 14-2-
802 which states that "[d]irectors shall be natural persons who are 18
years of age or older. . .. ,,89 The articles of incorporation or bylaws
may establish additional qualifications, although only the articles can
require that directors be residents of Georgia or that they be sharehold-
83. Id. § 1.34 cmt. a.
84. Id. § 1.34 cmt. b.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 3A.01(a).
87. Id. § 3A.01(b).
88. Id. § 3A.01 cmt. c. For different definitions of independent or outside director,
albeit for different purposes, see e.g., New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual,
§ 303.00 (noting composition of audit committee) and Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(a) (1995)
(disallowing deductions for employee remuneration in excess of $1 million).
89. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-802 (1989).
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ers of the corporation." The number of directors must be set by the
articles of incorporation or bylaws, or if permitted by those documents,
may be set by the shareholders or the board."
G. Committees
The ALl Principles require that large publicly held corporations have
an audit committee, and suggest such a committee for smaller corpora-
tions." In addition, all corporations are advised to have a committee
responsible for the nomination of directors, and large corporations are
advised to have a committee for executive compensation." The
a.c.G.A. does not contain recommendations or requirements for any
committees, although auditing, nominating, and compensation commit-
tees are among those commonly found in large publicly held corpora-
tions." Section 14-2-825 of the a.c.G.A. authorizes the board to
establish committees for the exercise of almost any board function."
Under the ALl Principles, every large publicly held corporation should
have an audit committee;" and it is recommended that, as a matter of
goodcorporate practice, every small publicly held corporation should also
have an audit committee." An audit committee is to consist of at least
three directors, the majority of whom have no significant relationship
with the corporation's senior executives." In addition, the members
may not currently be employed by the corporation or have been
employed by the corporation within the previous two years." The
purpose of the audit committee is to implement and support the board's
oversight function.l'"
90. Id.
91. Id. § 14-2-803. See generally James P. Hermance & Paul A. Quiros, The Dynamics
Among Shareholders, Directors, and Officers in Corporate Organizations Under Georgia
Law, 37 MERCERL. REV. 79 (1985).
92. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, §§ 3.05, 3A.02.
93. Id. §§ 3A.04, 3A.05.
94. GOLDSTEIN,supra note 57, § 8.2(e).
95. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-825 (1989); GOLDSTEIN,supra note 57, § 8.2(e).
96. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 3.05. As Comment a points out, "the New York
Stock Exchange requires listed companies to establish and maintain an audit committee"
made up of independent directors, and "[tJhe population of corporations covered by § 3.05
is roughly coextensive with the population of corporations listed on that Exchange." Id.
§ 3.05 cmt. a.
97. Id. § 3A.02.
98. Id. §§ 3.05, 3A.02. For definitions of "significant relationship" and "senior
executive," see supra notes 71, 78 and accompanying text.
99. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 3.05, 3A.02.
100. Id.
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The ALl Principles recommend eight specific duties to be performed
by the audit committee;'?' (1) recommend the hiring of, and review
the proposed termination of, the corporation's external auditor.P" (2)
review the external auditor's employment agreement.'?" (3) review the
appointment and replacement of the corporation's senior internal
auditing executive;'?' (4) provide a channel of communication through
which the internal and external auditors communicate with the
board.!" (5) review results of external audits;':" (6) review all finan-
cial statements prepared by external auditors and any significant related
disputes with management.l'" (7) consult with internal and external
auditors regarding the adequacy of the corporation's internal con-
trolsr''" and (8) consider major changes in the auditing and accounting
procedures employed.l'" The duties listed are representative in that
the committee may also perform other functions which fall within the
scope of its general purpose. 110
Section 3A.04 of the ALl Principles recommends that every publicly
held corporation, except when closely controlled, establish a nominating
committee for the purpose of recommending candidates for all director-
ships.!" This committee should be composed exclusively of directors
who are not officers or employees of the corporation and a majority of
whom do not have any significant relationship with the corporation's
senior executives.!" The intent is to insure that the board will be
made up of directors who can objectively evaluate the performance of
senior management.l" As noted above, the a.c.G.A. does not make
any statement regarding the establishment or make-up of a nominating
committee; however, section 14-2-825 authorizes the board of directors
to delegate the nominating function, although not the election of
directors, to a committee.!"
101. Id. § 3A.03.
102. Id. § 3A.03(a).
103. Id. § 3A.03(b).
104. Id. § 3A.03(c).
105. Id. § 3A.03(d).
106. Id. § 3A.03(e).
107. Id. § 3A.03(£).
108. Id. § 3A.03(g).
109. Id. § 3A.03(h).
110. Id. § 3A.03 cmt. c.
111. Id. § 3A.04(a).
112. Id. For definitions of "significant relationship" and "senior executives," see supra
notes 71, 78 and accompanying text.
113. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 3A.04 cmt. c.
114. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-825 (1989).
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In section 3A.05, the ALl Principles state that every large public
corporation should have a compensation committee.I" The committee
should be composed entirely of directors who are not employees of the
corporation, and a majority of whom have no significant relationships
with the corporation's senior executives.!" The basic purpose of the
committee is to implement and support the oversight function of the
board by: (1) recommending salary, bonus, stock options, and other
compensation for senior executives.!" (2) reviewing new executive
compensation programs and taking steps to modify existing programs
that are not reasonably related to executive performance; 118 and
(3) establishing and periodically reviewing policies regarding manage-
ment perquisites.I" In order to perform its function properly, the
committee should acquire relevant information, using methods such as
securing comparative data about compensation practices in similar
companies or retaining outside consultants to advise the corporation.F"
IV. DUTY OF CARE AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Part IV of the ALl Principles states the duty of care and the business
judgment rule applicable to directors and officers.F' They are in the
form of general legal standards and are intended to be consistent with
the majority position in most jurisdictions.P" The principles stated in
this Part are, except where specifically noted, designed to apply to all
types and sizes of business corporations, and so are "drafted flexibly to
take account of variations among them.,,123 Rejecting the suggestion
made in some cases, the Principles do not impose a higher degree of care
on the directors of banks and other financial institutions than that
which is required for the directors of other business corporations; the
Introductory Note labels such distinctions "unjustified and anachronis-
tiC.,,124And the ALl Principles demand the same duty of care and
115. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 3A.05(a).
116. [d. For definitions of "significant relationship" and "senior executives," see supra
notes 71, 78 and accompanying text.
117. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 3A.05(b)(1).
118. [d. § 3A.05(b)(2).
119. [d. § 3A.05(b)(3).
120. [d. § 3A.05 cmt. d.
121. [d. Part IV, Introductory Note a.
122. [d.
123. [d. Part IV, Introductory Note d.
124. ta.. see also 3A FLETCHER,CYCCORP.§ 1042 (perm. ed.).
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business judgment standards from corporate officers as they do from
directors. 125
A. Duty of Care
In section 4.01(a}, the Principles set forth the duty of care standards
for both officers and directors: performance of their functions (1) in good
faith; (2) in a manner believed to be in the best interest of the corpora-
tion; (3) and with the care, which under similar circumstances would be
exercised by an ordinarily prudent person.F" The duty includes an
obligation to ensure that inquiries are made where the circumstances
would alert a reasonable director or officer to the need.!"
The a.c.G.A. addresses the general standards for directors in section
14_2_830.128 Like the ALl Principles, the a.c.G.A. requires that
directors act in good faith.P" Georgia, however, did not adopt the
requirement found in the ALl Principles that a director reasonably
believe he is acting in the best interests of the corporation; the belief
need only be in good faith.P" In dropping the reasonableness require-
ment, the a.c.G.A. also departed from the Model Business Corporations
Act upon which it is based.l'" The difference reflects a desire not to
treat reasonableness as a separate and isolated factor but rather to view
it as one aspect of good faith.r"
The a.c.G.A. describes the "prudent person" portion of a director's
duty of care in terms almost identical to those of the ALl PrincipleeP"
According to the Official Comment, the prudent person standard
125. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 4.01 cmt. a. For an analysis and critique of Part
IV, see Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, the Business Judgment Rule, and the American
Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 Bus. LAW.1355 (1993).
126. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 4.01(a). For a critical analysis of § 4.01, see
William J. Carney, Section 4.01 of the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance
Project: Restatement or Misstatement?, 66 WASH.u. L.Q. 239 (1988).
127. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 4.01(a)(1).
128. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830 (1989).
129. Id. Good faith is a question not only of what is "best for the corporation" but for
its shareholders as well. Quinn v. Cardiovascular Physicians, P.C., 254 Ga. 216, 217-18,
326 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1985); Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 475, 246 S.E.2d 278, 281
(1978).
130. Furthermore, Georgia's definition of "good faith" may extend beyond the best
interests of the corporation to the protection of minority shareholder. Comolli, 241 Ga. at
465, 246 S.E.2d at 281. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830 (1989).
131. See William J. Carney, Changes in Corporate Practice Under Georgia's New
Business Corporation Code, 40 MERCERL. REV.655, 676 (1989).
132. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830 cmt. (1989).
133. Id. The Comment to § 14-2-830 refers to the Tentative Draft No.4 of the ALl
PRINCIPLES.
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incorporates the "basic director attributes of common sense, practical
wisdom, and informed judgment.Y'" No express duty of inquiry is
contained in the O.C.G.A. However, the duty could be implied from
holdings that even an inactive director owes a duty of due care to the
corporation. 135
The O.C.G.A. section on "Standards of Conduct for Officers," repeats
the standards for directors almost verbatim.l'"
B. The Business Judgment Rule
The ALl Principles codify the "business judgment rule," stating that
a business judgment which is made in goodfaith will satisfy an officer's
or director's duty of care so long as the officers or directors: (1) are not
classified as "interested;"!" (2) are reasonably informed regarding the
business judgment; and (3) rationally believe that the judgment is in the
best interest of the corporation.r" A party alleging a claim under
these provisions has the burden of proof regarding both the breach of a
duty as well as the resulting damages. 139
If the conduct of a director or officer meets these criteria, there can
be no violation of the duty of care under the Principlee.t'" On the
other hand, where a challenging party can meet its burden of proof in
demonstrating a failure to meet these criteria, the safe harbor of the
"business judgment rule" will be unavailable.J" The Principles provide
several illustrations regarding the application of these duties and
obligations. 142
The business judgment rule is not codifiedin Georgia. The Comment
to section 14-2-830 expressly states that the development and applica-
134. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830 cmt.
135. Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 463 F. Supp. 1183, 1196 (M.D. Ga.
1979) (citing and applying Georgia law).
136. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-842 (1989).
137. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 4.01(c). Section 1.23 defines interested as either:
(1) being a party to the transaction; (2) having a business, financial, or familial relationship
with a party to the transaction which would be expected to adversely affect judgment; (3)
having a pecuniary interest; or (4) being "subject to a controlling influence by a party to
the transaction or conduct or a person who has a material pecuniary interest in the
transaction." [d. §1.23(a).
138. [d. § 4.01(c).
139. [d. § 4.01(d).
140. [d. § 4.01 cmt. d.
141. [d.
142. [d. § 4.01(a) cmt. b, c. For a discussion and critique of the PRINCIPLES' treatment
of the business judgement rule, see R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging
the Business Judgment Rule, 48 Bus. LAW. 1337 (1993).
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tion of that rule should be left to the judiciary.l'" The Georgia Su-
preme Court has observed, "'No principle of law is more firmly fixed in
our jurisprudence than the one which declares that the courts will not
interfere in matters involving merely the judgment of the majority in
exercising control over corporate affairs."'144
C. Reliance on Others
In section 4.01(b), the ALl Principles reiterate the board's authority to
delegate any function of the board, and present examples of the parties
to whom functions may be delegated.v" A director may fulfill the duty
of care through reliance on a delegated party so long as the reliance is
in accordance with sections 4.02 and 4.03.146 In section 4.02, the
Principles elaborate on the ability of directors and officers to rely on
information obtained from directors, officers, corporate employees,
experts, and other persons who are believed to merit confidence.147 In
order to be entitled to rely, the director or officer must "reasonably
believe[] that reliance is warranted.v " In most cases, the party
relying on the information does not have a duty to verify independently
the information unless the circumstances indicated that it would have
been prudent to do SO.149
Section 4.03 of the ALl Principles expands on the authorization given
in section 4.01(b) for a director to rely on information obtained from a
committee of the board. 150 The information that may be relied upon
includes decisions, judgments, opinions, and statements prepared by a
duly authorized committee of the board.l'" In order for the director to
rely, he must be acting in good faith, not serving as a member of the
committee providing the information, and reasonably believe that
reliance is warranted.l'"
Section 14-2-830(b) ofthe a.c.G.A. is almost identical to the language
of the ALl Principles regarding directors' and officers' ability to rely on
143. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830 cmt.
144. Regenstein v. J. Regenstein Co., 213 Ga. 157, 159, 97 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1957)
(quoting with approval Bartow Lumber Co. v. Enwright, 131 Ga. 329, 333, 62 S.E. 233, 235
(1908». In Regenstein, the court refused to inquire into the wisdom of a corporation
continuing to operate one of its three stores at a loss. 213 Ga. at 161, 97 S.E.2d at 696.
145. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 4.01(b).
146. [d.
147. [d. § 4.02.
148. [d.
149. [d. § 4.02 cmt. i.
150. Id. § 4.03.
151. [d.
152. [d.
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information.P" Although this Code section is not applicable to officers,
the same standard is applied to officers through section 14_2_842.154
V. DUTY OF FAIR DEALING
Part V of the ALl Principles sets forth the duty of fair dealing as it
applies to directors, officers, and controlling shareholders who make
decisions affecting the corporation in matters in which they have a
pecuniary interest. 155 Only officers who are "senior executives" are
covered in this Part; the duties of other officers and employees are
governed by corporation or agency law.156 A controlling shareholder
also has a duty of fair dealing; because this is "not necessarily the same
as that of a director or senior executive," it is dealt with in a separate
chapter of this Part.157 The materials related to the duty of fair
dealing are broken down into four chapters.l'" Chapter 1, which
consists of section 5.01, states the general principle of fair dealing.l'"
Chapter 2 sets forth the legal principles which govern the conduct of
153. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830Cb)(1989).
154. Id. § 14-2-842.
155. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, Part V, Introductory Note a. As the Introductory
Note states, this Part "does not address nonpecuniary conflict-of-interest situations which
might be dealt with by the courts in appropriate cases." Id. Thus, the term "duty of fair
dealing" is used to make clear that these principles apply only to pecuniary interests and
not to a broader range of concerns which have been discussed under the label "duty of
loyalty." Id. For a good description of this Part by the Reporter, see Marshall L. Small,
Conflicts of Interest and the ALl Corporate Governance Project-A Reporter's Perspective,
48 BuS. LAW.1377 (1993). For a different perspective, see John F. Johnson & Frederick
H. Alexander, The Effect of Disinterested Director Approval of Conflict Transactions under
the ALl Corporate Governance Project-A Practitioner's Perspective, 48 Bus. LAW.1394
(1993).
156. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, Part V, Introductory Note b. Section 1.33 states
that "senior executive" means the officers described in section 1.27(a)-(b). Id. § 1.33.
Section 1.27(a) defines "officer" as "the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, and
accounting officers of a corporation." Id. § 1.27(a). Section 1.27(b) includes within the
definition of officer,
to the extent not encompassed by the foregoing, the chairman of the board of
directors (unless the chairman neither performs a policymaking function other
than as a director nor receives a material amount of compensation in excess of
director's fees), president, treasurer, and secretary, and a vice-president or vice-
chairman who is in charge of a principal business unit, division, or function (such




158. Id. Part V, Introductory Note d.
159. Id. § 5.01.
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senior executives and directors.l'" Chapter 3 discu~ses the duty of fair
dealing as it relates to controlling shareholders.I'" The final chapter
addresses the issue of transfer of control as it relates to the duty of fair
dealing. 162
A. Duty of Fair Dealing
In section 5.01, the Principles set forth the general proposition that
directors, senior executives, and controlling shareholders are bound by
a duty of fair dealing when confronted with matters affecting the
corporation for which they are classified as being "interested.t'P" This
duty may include the disclosure of information as set forth in subsequent
sections of this Part. 164
The O.C.G.A. addresses this subject matter under the heading of
"Conflicting Interest Transactions."!" The term "conflicting interest,"
as defined by the Code, is substantially the same as the Principles'
definition of "interested.v " The Comment to the Code section indi-
cates that the definition is exclusive and that a director's interest is only
conflicting if it falls within the definition.I'" While the Principles are
silent regarding the exclusiveness of the definition of "interested.r'''"
it would seem to operate in the same way. The O.C.G.A. provisions
apply only to transactions, not to policy decisionsr''" section 5.02 of the
ALl Principles appears to have the same limitation.F''
B. General Safe Harbor
In section 5.02, the Principles set forth the "safe harbor" provisions for
directors and senior executives who enter into transactions with the
corporation.i'" All of the safe harbor provisions require that the
interested director or senior executive make the required disclosure to
160. Id. §§ 5.02-5.09.
161. Id. §§ 5.10-5.14. For the definition of "controlling shareholder," see infra note 266
and accompanying text.
162. Id. §§ 5.15, 5.16.
163. Id. § 5.01. For the definition of "interested," see supra note 137.
164. Id. § 5.01.
165. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-860 to -864.
166. Id. § 14-2-860; see supra note 137.
167. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-860 cmt. (1989).
168. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 1.23.
169. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-860 cmt.
170. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 5.02.
171. Id. § 5.02. This section explicitly excludes the payment of compensation from its
coverage. Id.
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the corporate decisionmaker+" Disclosure must be of the conflict of
interest, as described in section 1.14(a), and of material facts known to
the insider about the transaction, as described in section 1.14(b).173
Following disclosure, the interested director or senior executive can
fulfill the duty of fair dealing with the corporation in four ways.
First, if the transaction is fair to the corporation, the interested
director or senior executive must obtain authorization or ratification
from the corporate decisionmaker+"
Second, the interested director or senior executive may obtain consent
in advance of the transaction from disinterested directors "who could
reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corpora-
tion at the time of such authorization.Y" If the interested party is a
senior executive but not a director, a disinterested superior may grant
the authorization.F"
Third, under certain circumstances, the interested director or senior
executive may secure ratification after the transaction occurs.177
Ratification can be granted by disinterested directors who could have
reasonably concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation at
the time it was entered into.178 The required circumstances are that
the transaction must have been approved in advance by a corporate
172. Id. § 5.02(a)(1). Disclosure occurs when the interested director advises the
decision maker of material facts known to the interested director. Id. § 1.14. "Corporate
decisionmaker" is defined as "that corporate official or body with the authority to make a
particular decision for the corporation." Id. § 1.11.
173. Id. § 5.02(a)(1). Section 1.14 provides:
(a) Disclosure Concerning a Conflict of Interest. A director [§ 1.13], senior
executive [§ 1.33], or controlling shareholder [§ 1.10]makes "disclosure concerning
a conflict of interest" if the director, senior executive, or controlling shareholder
discloses to the corporate decisionmaker [§ 1.11] who authorizes in advance or
ratifies the transaction in question the material facts [§ 1.25] known to the
director, senior executive, or controlling shareholder concerning the conflict of
interest, or if the corporate decisionmaker knows of those facts at the time the
transaction is authorized or ratified.
(b) Disclosure Concerning a Transaction. A director, senior executive, or
controlling shareholder makes "disclosure concerning a transaction" if the director,
senior executive, or controlling shareholder discloses to the corporate decision-
maker who authorizes in advance or ratifies the transaction in question the
material facts known to the director, senior executive, or controlling shareholder
concerning the transaction, or if the corporate decisionmaker knows of those facts
at the time the transaction is authorized or ratified.
Id. § 1.14.
174. Id. § 5.02(a)(2)(A).
175. Id. § 5.02(a)(2)(B).
176. Id.
177. Id. § 5.02(a)(2)(C).
178. Id.
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decision-maker to whom advance disclosure was made,"? that failure
to seek broader advance approval was not unreasonable, ISOand that
failure to seek broader advance approval did not significantly harm the
corporation. 181
Fourth, the interested director may secure consent or ratification from
disinterested shareholders, provided the transaction "does not constitute
a waste of corporate assets . . . at the time of the shareholder ac-
tion."lS2
The burden of proof regarding a challenge to a transaction lies with
the challenging party except where there was not adherence to any of
the safe harbor provisions of section 5.02, in which case the affected
director or senior executive would have the burden of proving that the
transaction was fair to the corporation. 183
This section also provides that failure to disclose, or defective
disclosure, may be cured by a subsequent ratification by a majority of
disinterested directors after disclosure of facts which should have been
disclosed initially, so long as such ratification occurs within a reasonable
period of time after a suit has been filed.1s4
The Principles provide several illustrations regarding the application
of this section.l'" The Comments also make clear that de minimis
transactions are not to be considered under section 5.02.1S6
Like the ALl Principles, the a.c.G.A. provides a safe harbor from
judicial inquiry into corporate transactions with interested directors and
officers when the transaction is fair to the corporation, or when
disinterested directors or shareholders consent to, or ratify, the
transaction following disclosure by the interested party."? However,
the a.c.G.A. differs in what information must be disclosed and the
requirements for each safe harbor.
When a transaction is fair to the corporation, the a.c.G.A. unlike the
ALl Principles, allows the transaction to stand even if the interested
party never disclosed the conflict of interest.l'" As long as the court
179. [d. § 5.02(a)(2)(C)(i), (ii),
180. [d. § 5.02(a)(2)(C)(iii).
181. [d. § 5.02(a)(2)(C)(iv).
182. [d. § 5.02(a)(2)(D).
183. [d. § 5.02(b).
184. [d. § 5.02(c).
185. [d. § 5.02 cmt. c.
186. [d.
187. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-861 to -864 (1989).
188. [d. §§ 14-2-861(b)(3), -864(c)(3). But see id. § 14-2-864 cmt. (suggesting that
contrary to the text of the O.C.G.A., full disclosure must precede defense of a transaction
on the grounds of fairness). Of course, other sections of the Code such as that governing
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is persuaded that the transaction is fair to the corporation, no corporate
decision-maker is required to consent to, or ratify, the interested
transaction. 189
If disinterested directors approve an interested transaction, the
a.c.G.A. places no requirement of reasonableness on the decision of
those directors.!" Furthermore, when ratification occurs, the Code
does not require any justification for failure to secure approval in
advance.'?' For both consent in advance and later ratification, the
only restriction is that the decision follow adequate disclosure.l'" For
directors only, the Code allows more limited disclosure if the interested
director is unable to provide full information because of a professional
canon or a duty of confidentiality.+" The ALl Principles do not appear
to address this type of situation.
The a.c.G.A. also requires no judicial inquiry regarding the reason-
ableness of disinterested shareholder consent or ratification. 194
Interested directors and officers must provide the required disclosure
prior to a shareholder vote.!" In addition, an interested director must
identify which votes are controlled by that director or a related
party. 196 However, if interested shares are not properly identified in
advance, the a.c.G.A. permits a court to uphold the shareholder vote if
the interested director demonstrates that withholding the information
did not influence, or was not intended to influence, the shareholder
vote.197
C. Director Compensation
In section 5.03, the ALl Principles address the duty of fair dealing as
it applies to the compensation received by a corporate director or senior
executive.198 This section only applies to compensation which is
received for the services performed by a director or senior executive in
that capacity.!" If the compensation is received for services in some
fraud may mandate disclosure. See generally, GOLDSTEIN,supra note 57, § 8.8(c).
189. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-861(b)(3), -864(c)(3) (1989).
190. Id. §§ 14-2-862(a), -864(c)(l). Arguably, a director's duty of good faith and ordinary
diligence includes some degree of reasonableness.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. § 14-2-862(b).
194. Id. §§ 14-2-863, -864(c)(2).
195. Id. §§ 14-2-863(a), -864(c)(2).
196. Id. § 14-2-863(d).
197. Id. § 14-2-863(e).
198. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 5.03.
199. Id. § 5.03 cmt. f.
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other capacity, it will be governed by section 5.02.200And if the senior
executive's compensation is governed by a plan of general applicability,
it will be dealt with under Part IV, the Duty of Care and the Business
Judgment Rule.201
The Principles state four alternative approaches for meeting the duty
of fair dealing with respect to director or senior executive compensa-
tion:202 (1) "[t]he compensation is fair to the corporation when ap-
proved;,,203 (2) "[t]he compensation is authorized in advance by
disinterested directors.T" (3) the compensation is subsequently
ratified by disinterested directors acting in accordance with the business
judgment rule;205or (4) the compensation is authorized in advance or
subsequently ratified and does not constitute a waste of corporate assets
at the time of the shareholder action.i" In the same manner as
section 5.02, a party challenging the compensation of a director or senior
officer has the burden of proof, except where it is established that there
was not compliance with any of the provisions of this section, in which
case the burden shifts."?
The O.C.G.A., through a 1989 amendment, removed director compen-
sation transactions from the enumerated safe harbor provisions of
section 14_2_861.208 The Code specifically authorizes the board of
directors to determine directors' compensation "[u]nless the articles of
incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.T'" As a result, the issue
would be handled in the same manner as any other director's conflict of
interest: through disinterested director or shareholder approval or under
the fairness standard.i"?
Senior executive compensation is similarly not specifically addressed
by the O.C.G.A.'s safe harbor provisions for conflict of interest transac-
200. [d.
201. [d.
202. [d. § 5.03.
203. [d. § 5.03(a)(1).
204. [d. § 5.03(a)(2). In the case of an executive who is not a director, the ALl
Principles allows advance approval by a superior acting in accordance with the business
judgment rule. [d.
205. [d. § 5.03(a)(3). In addition, the Principles requires justification for the failure to
obtain advance authorization from directors: That a disinterested corporate decisionmaker
approved in advance, that the interested party acted reasonably, and that the absence of
advance authorization did not significantly harm the corporation. [d.
206. [d. § 5.03(a)(4).
207. [d. § 5.03(b).
208. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-861 cmt. (1989).
209. [d. § 14-2-811; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 57, § 8.1(j).
210. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-861 cmt.
26 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
tions, and would thus be handled through director approval, shareholder
approval, or by evaluation under the fairness standard."!
D. Corporate Position, Property, and Information
In section 5.04, the ALl Principles set forth the general rule that a
director or senior executive may not use corporate position, corporate
property, or material nonpublic information to secure a personal
pecuniary gain.212 The Principles recognize exceptions to this general
rule: (1) when the use is paid for and the transaction is in accordance
with section 5.02;213(2) when the use constitutes compensationr''" (3)
when nonproprietary information is being used for a purpose other than
trading of the corporation's securities, and the corporation is not
harmedr'" (4) when the use was authorized in advance or ratifiedr'"
or (5) when the benefit is received as a shareholder, and is a benefit
available to all similarly situated shareholders.f'" Liability under this
section is limited to the value of the improper benefit which was received
and retained, except where the conduct resulted in foreseeable harm
beyond the benefit received.r"
Rather than specifically outlining a duty not to use corporate position,
property, or nonpublic information for personal pecuniary gain, the
O.C.G.A. specifies that articles of incorporation cannot exculpate a
director for "any transaction from which the director received an
improper personal benefit.,,219 Because the O.C.G.A. provisions on
conflicting interests apply only to transactions with the corporation, they
do not provide a safe harbor for directors and officers who use corporate
position, property, or information.F" In fact, the safe harbors for
conflicting interests do not shelter directors in any "situations not
involving transactions, such as corporate inaction, or actions by directors
211. Id. § 14-2-864 (1989).
212. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 5.04(a).
213. Id. § 5.04(a)(l).
214. Id. § 5.04(a)(2).
215. Id. § 5.04(a)(3).
216. Id. § 5.04(a)(4). Authorization or ratification must be by disinterested directors
or shareholders, and must follow the requirements of § 5.02 regarding disclosure and
review. Id. § 5.04(a)(4).
217. Id. § 5.04(a)(5).
218. Id. § 5.04(c).
219. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-202(b)(4)(D) (1989); see also Carney, supra note 131, at 676-77.
Furthermore, the duty can be impled from the general standards of conduct. Quinn v.
Cardiovascular Physicians, P.C., 254 Ga. 216, 217, 326 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1985).
220. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-860 cmt. (1989); see also Carney, supra note 131, at 678.
1995] ALl PRINCIPLES 27
that are taken with respect to third parties, if no corporate transaction
is involved.Y"
E. Corporate Opportunities
In section 5.05, the ALl Principles establish the requirement that a
director or senior executive must first offer a corporate opportunity to
the corporation prior to taking it for personal advantage. 222 If the
opportunity is rejected by the corporation.P" the director or senior
executive may pursue the opportunity within the guidelines of section
5.06 regarding the ability to compete with the corporation.F"
A failure to offer an opportunity to the corporation, or a defective
disclosure of material facts, may be cured through a subsequent
ratification which occurs no later than a reasonable time after a suit
contesting the matter has been filed.225 However, such ratification will
cure complete failure to offer the opportunity to the corporation in
advance only if there was a good faith belief that the opportunity was
not a corporate one.226
Improper appropriation of corporate opportunities is clearly prohibited
under Georgia law/27 and the O.C.G.A. provides that the articles of
incorporation may not eliminate a director's liability for misappropria-
tion of a corporate opportunity.f" However, the O.C.G.A. does not
define a safe harbor when it is appropriate for a director or officer to
take a corporate opportunity. The statutory provisions which provide a
safe harbor for conflicting interests do not apply, because they cover only
transactions involving the corporation, and provide that their definition
of "conflicting interest" is both comprehensive and exclusive.F"
However, the general statutory safe harbor may provide guidance for
221. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-860 cmt.; see also Carney, supra note 131, at 678.
222. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 5.05(a).
223. Id. The rejection must be one of the following: (1) fair to the corporation; (2)
approved in advance by disinterested directors; (3) authorized in advance by a disinterested
superior following the business judgment rule; or (4) authorized or ratified by disinterested
shareholders, provided the rejection is not a waste of corporate assets. Id.
224. Id. § 5.05, cmt. to § 5.05(a); see also Michael Begert, The Corporate Opportunity
Doctrine and Outside Business Interests, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.827 (1989).
225. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, §§ 5.05(d), (e).
226. Id. § 5.05(e).
227. See, e.g., Quinn, 254 Ga. at 218,326 S.E.2d at 463. The court characterized the
appropriation of a corporate opportunity as "but specie of the command that fiduciaries act
with undivided loyalty, and is another manifestation of the requirement of utmost good
faith." Id.
228. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-202(b)(4)(A) (1989).
229. Id. § 14-2-861, -860 cmt.
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proper appropriation of an opportunity that might otherwise qualify as
a corporate one."?
Furthermore, the Georgia Supreme Court has expressly adopted
criteria to determine whether or not a director or officer has improperly
taken a corporate opportunity.r" First, in order for the business
opportunity to qualify as a corporate one, it must be in the line of
business of the corporation, and the corporation must have a "legal or
equitable interest or expectancy" from a prior relationship or right.232
Second, if the opportunity is a corporate one, the court determines
whether its appropriation was fair under the circumstances.f"
Although a director in Georgia does not have the benefit of a statutory
safe harbor, it seems extremely unlikely that a claim would arise if the
corporation had expressly declined to take advantage of the corporate
opportunity. It is even less likely that a Georgia court would find
appropriation of the opportunity to be unfair under such circumstanc-
es.234
F. Competition with the Corporation
In section 5.06, the ALl Principles prohibit directors and senior
executives from engaging in competition with the corporation in order to
realize a pecuniary gain unlessr'" (1) there is no foreseeable harm to
the corporation.f" or (2) the competition is authorized in advance.r"
230. GOLDSTEIN,supra note 57, § 8.8(c).
231. Southeast Consultants, Inc. v. McCrary Eng'g Corp., 246 Ga. 503, 507-08, 273
S.E.2d 112, 117 (1980).
232. Id. The Court followed the lead of the Minnesota Supreme Court in merging the
"line of business test" with the "interest or expectancy" tests commonly used to define
business opportunities. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court later elaborated on the "interest
or expectancy" test in United Seal & Rubber Co. v. Bunting, 248 Ga. 814, 816, 285 S.E.2d
721, 723 (1982) (holding that a corporation does not have an expectancy in its customers,
where there is no contract between them and no discrete project is at issue. as in
Southeastern Consultants).
233. Southeastern Consultants, 246 Ga. at 508,273 S.E.2d at 117. At this stage of the
inquiry, the director or officer bears the burden of proving that taking the opportunity was
fair. Phoenix Airline Servo V. Metro Airlines, 260 Ga. 584, 587, 397 S.E.2d 699, 702-03
(1990).
234. In Southeastern Consultants, the appropriating former president had secretly
created a new company, at the expense of the existing company, in order to appropriate the
existing company's business opportunities. Id. at 503, 273 S.E.2d at 114.
235. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 5.06(a).
236. Id. § 5.06(a)(l). The ALl Principles permits competition causing foreseeable harm
only if the harm is outweighed by foreseeable benefit. Id.
237. Id. § 5.06(a)(2). Disinterested director approval must conform to the business
judgment rule; disinterested shareholder approval must not waste corporate assets. Id.
§ 5.06(a)(2)-(a)(3).
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This section is intended to include competition for customers, suppliers,
employees, and assets used in the business.F" Maintaining a position
on the board of a competing corporation does not in and of itself
constitute a violation of this section.f"
Although the a.c.G.A. does not directly address the question of
competition, the Georgia Supreme Court has confronted the issue in
Regenstein u. J. Regenstein CO.240 The court held that
"so long as they act in good faith toward their company and its
associates, [corporate officers and directors] are not precluded from
engaging in a business similar to that carried on by their corporation,
either on their own behalf or for another corporation ofwhich they are
likewise directors or officers.,,241
This approach would appear to be somewhat broader than that of the
Principlesr'"
G. Transactions Between Corporations
In section 5.07, the Principles set forth the circumstances under which
a transaction between two corporations with a common director or senior
executive will be considered an interested transaction. 243 If the
common director or senior executive personally and substantially
participates in the negotiation.f" or if the common director casts a
deciding vote to approve the transaction, then section 5.02 (Transactions
with the Corporation) will govern the transaction?"
Rather than focusing on a specific director's behavior in the transac-
tion, Georgia law focuses on the level at which such a transaction is
approved. In its definition of "conflicting interest," the a.c.G.A. includes
transactions between corporations with a common director (or a director
in one corporation who is an agent or employee of the other corporation)
if the transaction requires action by the board on which the common
director sits.246 Such "board level" transactions+" must be evaluated
238. ld. § 5.06 cmt. c.
239. ld.
240. 213 Ga. 157, 97 S.E.2d 693 (1957).
241. ld. at 162, 97 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting 3 FLETCHERCYCLOPEDIACORPORATIONS214,
§ 856).
242. ALl Principles, supra note 24, § 5.06, cmt. a (citing Regenstein v. J. Regenstein
Co., 213 Ga. 157, 97 S.E.2d 693, as an example of a more permissive attitude).
243. ld. § 5.07(a).
244. ld. § 5.07(a)(1). The participation can take place on behalf of either corporation.
ld.
245. ld. § 5.07(a)(2)-(b).
246. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-860(1)(B) (1989).
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as conflicts of interest.i" Under Georgia law, a director of two corpo-
rations could thus be involved in a conflict despite having played a
passive role.
H. Associates
The ALl Principles impose a duty that a director, senior executive, or
shareholder, when advancing the interests of an associate, must abide
by the same duty of fair dealing which govern their activities when
dealing with their own interests.r" Real persons defined as associates
are enumerated relatives, in-laws, and relatives of persons sharing the
director's or senior executive's home.P" Entities defined as associates
include trusts and estates which benefit people who are associates."!
In addition, associates include trusts, estates, incompetents, conserva-
tees, or minors for whom the director, senior executive, or shareholder
serves as a fiduciary.252 However, business organizations are pre-
sumed to be associates only when the director, senior executive, or
shareholder owns more than ten percent of any equity class.253
The a.c.G.A. does not list a separate duty applicable when advancing
the interests of an associate. However, conflicting interests for directors
and officers include the interests of "related persons.f''" which the
Code defines very similarly to the ALl Principles' definition of an
associate, except that business organizations are not included.f" This
definition is exclusive and would appear to govern even though in
subsequent sections reference is made to the duties of directors and
officers when they involve the interests of "any person with whom or
with which he has a personal, economic,or other association.v'"
247. GOLDSTEIN,supra note 57, § 8.8(c).
248. Id.
249. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24. § 5.08.
250. Id. § 1.03(a)(1)(A).
251. Id.
252. Id. § 1.03(a)(1)(B).
253. Id. § 1.03(b).
254. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-860(3) (1989).
255. [d. The O.C.G.A. provides:
(3) "Related person" of a director means:
(A) The spouse (or a parent or sibling thereof) of the director or a child,
grandchild, sibling, parent (or spouse of any thereof), or an individual having the
same home as the director or a trust or estate of which an individual specified in
this subparagraph is a substantial beneficiary; or
(B) A trust, estate, incompetent, conservatee, or minor of which the director is
a fiduciary.
Id.
256. Id. § 14-2-86Ha).
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1. Exculpation
Notwithstanding other prohibitions in the ALl Principles, section 5.09
allows a director or senior executive to engage in selected conflict of
interest transactions if doing so is consistent with existing standards of
the corporation.f" Such standards can permit interested transactions,
use of corporate position, or use of property, if expected to recur in the
ordinary course of business and corporate opportunities, if not learned
of on the job, if not reasonably believed offered to the corporation, or if
not learned of through the use of corporate information or propertyf"
Section 1.36 defines standard of the corporation as "a valid certificate or
bylaw provision or board of directors or shareholder resolution.r=" The
intent is to allow disinterested directors or shareholders to establish
guidelines in advance in order that certain transactions or activities may
be conducted without requesting approval from the board.f'"
The O.C.G.A. in section 14-2-801 sets forth the requirements and
duties of the board of directors.f" The Code is silent on senior execu-
tives. In this section, the Code recognizes that limitations on the board
may be stated in the articles of incorporation, bylaws, and shareholder
agreements.r'" It would appear that the concept of a standard of the
corporation may be established through these provisions.f"
However, the Code specifically forbids adoption of any provision in the
articles of incorporation that waives or limits a director's liability for
"any appropriation, in violation of his duties, of any business opportunity
of the corporation.t=" and for "any transaction from which the director
received an improper personal benefit.,,265
257. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 5.09.
258. Id.
259. Id. § 1.36.
260. Id. § 5.09 cmt. c; see also Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel:
Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors,
57 FORDHAM L. REV.375 (1988) (discussing an earlier draft of the ALl Principles which
merely allowed the Board to delegate approval of conflict of interest transactions to a
committee or individual).
261. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-801 (1989).
262. Id. § 14-2"801(b).
263. Id.
264. Id. § 14-2-202(b)(4)(A).
265. Id. § 14-2-202(b)(4)(D).
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J. Controlling Shareholder's Duty of Fair Dealing
The ALl Principles define a controlling shareholdersf" duty of fair
dealing as follows: when transacting business with the corporation, this
duty is fulfilled if the transaction was fair to the corporation at the time
it was entered into,267or the transaction is authorized in advance or
subsequently ratified by disinterested shareholders following disclo-
sure.268 In addition, an authorized or ratified transaction must not
"constitute a waste of corporate assets ... at the time of the shareholder
action. ,,269
In the following section, the ALl Principles set forth a general rule
that a controlling shareholder may not use position or corporate property
to secure a personal pecuniary gain."? Further, when trading that
corporation's securities, a controlling shareholder may not use nonpublic
information for gain."?' Exceptions are recognized where: (1) value is
given for the use, and the use meets one of the shareholder safe harbors
of section 5.10;272 (2) the benefit is made available proportionately to
other shareholders similarly situated.F" or (3) in the case of benefit
derived solely from the position of controlling shareholder and is not
unfair to other shareholders.F" All of these exceptions are subject to
the general requirement that the use not be unlawful.F"
Section 5.12 of the ALl Principles establishes the general rule that a
controlling shareholder is prohibited from taking advantage of a
corporate opportunity unlessr'" (1) it is fair to the corporationr"? or
(2) the taking is authorized in advance or subsequently ratified by
disinterested shareholders, and the taking does not constitute waste.F"
266. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 1.10. A controlling shareholder is defined as one
who: (1) owns voting share of over 50%; (2) "[oltherwise exercises a controlling influence
over the management or policies of the corporation or the transaction or conduct in
question;" or (3) owns or controls voting shares of over 25%, unless another person has a
greater percentage of control. Id.
267. Id. § 5.10(a)(1).
268. Id. § 5.10(a)(2).
269. Id.
270. Id. § 5.11.
271. Id.
272. Id. § 5.11(a)(1).
273. Id. § 5. 11(a)(2).
274. Id.
275. Id. § 5.11(a).
276. Id. § 5.12.
277. Id. § 5.12(a)(1).
278. Id. § 5.12(a)(2).
1995] ALl PRINCIPLES 33
A corporate opportunity is very narrowly defined for purposes of
section 5.12.279 If a business opportunity is developed or received by
the corporation, or if the shareholder learns of it primarily because of
the relationship with the corporation, then it is a corporate .opportuni-
ty.280 Alternatively, a corporate opportunity exists when the control-
ling shareholder holds out to other shareholders that, rather than being
within the controlling shareholder's scope of activities, the opportunity
is within the scope of the corporation's current or projected activi-
ties.281 This narrow definition of a corporate opportunity is designed
to balance a shareholder's right to compete with the corporation against
the shareholder's obligation not to seize opportunities of the corpora-
tion.282
In section 5.13, the ALl Principles extend the special duties of a
controlling shareholder to situations when the controlling shareholder
is advancing the interests of an associate.r" Associates of controlling
shareholders would appear to be defined in the same way as associates
of directors, senior executives, or shareholders.f"
In section 5.14, the ALl Principles provide a safe harbor for a
controlling shareholder who relies upon a standard of the corporation in
the same manner that section 5.09 protects a director or senior
executive.i'" The effect is to allow disinterested shareholders to
establish a standard of the corporation in advance of a transaction with
a controlling shareholder. 286
The O.C.G.A. is silent as to a duty of fair dealing for a controlling
shareholder. Cases address duties of "majority" shareholders, but the
term seems to encompass only owners of fifty percent or more of voting
equitiesf" rather than the ALl's more comprehensive definition. When
Georgia courts condemn the actions of a majority shareholder, that
shareholder is usually also a director or officer of the corporation.288
279. Id. § 5.12(b), cmt. d; see Begert, supra note 224, at 842-43.
280. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 5.12(b)(l).
281. Id. § 5.12 (b)(2).
282. Id. § 5.12 cmt. d; Begert, supra note 224.
283. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 5.13.
284. Id. §§ 1.03, 1.23.
285. Id. § 5.14. However, unlike directors and senior executives, a controlling
shareholder may not rely on a standard authorizing appropriation of corporate opportuni-
ties or appropriation or engagement in a competing business. See id. § 5.09.
286. Id. § 5.09 cmt. c.
287. See generally Hermance & Quiros, supra note 91, at 86,91-93; see also Southern
Cellular Telecom, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 286,431 S.E.2d 115 (1993) (in which the holder of 49%
of the shares was referred to as a minority shareholder).
288. See, e.g., Quinn, 254 Ga. 216, 326 S.E.2d 460.
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However, the Georgia Court of Appeals has distinguished a separate
duty solely based on the status of a majority shareholder:
Under such circumstances ['close corporations'], it would be inconsis-
tent with the realities of the business world to impose a fiduciary
relationship upon the directors and officers of a close corporation to
protect minority shareholders, but not on the majority shareholder who
really controls the corporation. Thus, ... majority shareholders must
act in good faith when managing corporate affairs.f"
Other than this obligation of good faith, the Georgia courts have yet to
outline the parameters ofa majority shareholder's duty ofcare; however,
it is likely to parallel that of officers and directors.
K. Management Buyout
In section 5.15, the ALl Principles deal with the issue of a manage-
ment buyout of the corporation.f'" Where directors, principal senior
executives, or their associates are interested in the transaction, they will
have the burden of proving that the transaction was fair to the
shareholders of the corporation.?" An exception exists when the
controlling shareholder makes a transfer. 292 In addition, this burden
may be shifted where: (1) there was a public disclosure of the proposed
transaction; (2) the parties interested in making a competing proposal
have access to relevant information and a reasonable opportunity to
make a proposal; (3) the transaction was approved in advance by
disinterested directors; and (4) the transaction was approved in advance
or ratified by disinterested shareholders.i" Burden shifting does not
apply unless the corporation is publicly held.294 When the burden
shifts, a challenger may prevail by proving that the terms of the
transaction amount to a waste of corporate assets.?"
The O.C.G.A. has no specific procedures for avoiding conflict of
interest charges in a management buyout situation. If the corporation
is party to the sale, interested directors and senior executives would be
289. Marshall v. W.E. Marshall Co., 189 Ga. App. 510, 512, 376 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1988).
In Marshall, the majority shareholder was also the corporation's president and chairman
of its board of directors. A separate claim was allowed to proceed against the majority
shareholder for breach of his majority shareholder duty. Id.
290. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 5.15 cmt. a.
291. Id. § 5.15(a).
292. Id.
293. Id. § 5.15(b).
294. Id.
295. Id.
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protected by the general safe harbors for fair dealing.i" Unlike the
Principles, under Georgia law, purchasers in such a sale might omit
disclosure altogether if the transaction is fair to the corporation, or
might need approval or ratification by directors only, or shareholders
only, rather than by both.297 If the corporation is not a party to the
sale of the corporation, and directors and officers personally purchase
securities from third parties, the directors and officers apparently owe
no special duty to the corporation.298 The existence of a motive to
obtain control of the corporation is apparently irrelevant. 299
L. Shareholder Sales
In section 5.16, the ALl Principles address the issue of a controlling
shareholder disposing of voting equity securities.i"" The Principles
adopt the general approach that a shareholder has the right to dispose
of shares to anyone and at any price.301 There are two exceptions to
this rule. First, disposal of the shares must be accompanied by
disclosure to any minority shareholders involved in connected transac-
tions with the purchaser.r'" This disclosure must be made so that
minority holders are informed of the control share premium when they
set their prices for selling noncontrol shares.i''" The second situation
in which a controlling shareholder is restricted in selling voting shares
is when ''(i]t is apparent from the circumstances that the purchaser is
likely to violate the duty of fair dealing" for financial gain. 304
The a.c.G.A. does not appear to restrict the transfer of shares except
where restrictions are adopted in the articles of incorporation, bylaws,
shareholder agreements, or agreement between shareholders and the
296. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-861 to -864 (1989); Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232
(1903). The court held that a director who knows non-public information is required to
disclose it before he deals with a shareholder, or to refrain from dealing with the
shareholder altogether if disclosure violates a duty of confidentiality. Id. at 368, 45 S.E.
at 234.
297. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-861 to -864.
298. King Mfg. Co. v. Clay, 216 Ga. 581, 585-86, 118 S.E.2d 581, 584-85 (1961) (This
case was decided before the current version of the Georgia Business Corporation Act was
adopted; the statute is silent on the question).
299. Id.
300. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, § 5.16.
301. Id. § 5.16 cmt. c.
302. Id. § 5.16(a).
303. Id. § 5.16 cmt. d.
304. Id. § 5.16(b).
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corporation.i''" The restrictions may be adopted for specified reasons,
or for "any ... reasonable purpose.v''"
Although the corporation has a duty to minority shareholders when
purchasing the stock of a controlling shareholder.F" Georgia courts do
not appear to have addressed the issue of whether a controlling
shareholder owes a duty of care regarding the sale of stock to third
parties.P'"
VI. TRANSACTIONS IN CONTROL AND TENDER OFFERS
Part VI of the ALl Principles address the role of directors and
shareholders in transactions in control and in tender offers in two
separa te sections.P"
A. Transactions in Control
The ALl Principles define the term "transactions in control" as a shift
of control in which the corporation has taken part in negotiating the
transaction."? Transactions in control include mergers, consolidations,
an issuance of voting equity securities "to effect an acquisition of the
assets of another corporation" such that it would be a transaction in
control of the other corporation, and certain voting share exchanges.f"
In addition a transaction in control includes "[aJ sale of assets that
would leave the corporation without a significant continuing busi-
ness,,,312and an issuance of securities or other transaction that would
cause a change in corporate control.i"
The ALl Principles provide that a decision by the board of directors to
approve, reject, or decline to consider a proposal to engage in a
transaction in control is governed by the business judgment rule.314
305. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-627 (1989).
306. [d. § 14-2-627(c).
307. Hermance & Quiros, supra note 91, at 89-90. In addition, a corporation owes a
duty to one minority shareholder when purchasing shares of another minority shareholder
to obtain a majority block. Comolli, 241 Ga. at 475, 246 S.E.2d at 281.
308. GOLDSTEIN,supra note 57, § 8.8(b); Hermance & Quiros, supra note 91, at 89-90.
309. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, Part VI, Introductory Note.
310. [d. § 1.38.
311. [d. "Voting equity security" is defined in § 1.40 as an equity security, defined in
§ 1.20 as "(a) a share in a corporation or similar security, or (b) a security convertible, with
or without consideration, into such a security ... ," that is a "voting security," which is
defined in § 1.41(a) as one which "entitles its record holder ... to vote for the election of
directors." [d. §§ 1.40, 1.21, 1.41.
312. [d. § 1.38(a)(2).
313. [d. § 1.38(a)(3). Control is defined in § 1.08. [d. § 1.08.
314. [d. § 6.01(a) cmt. a. However, if a director or principal senior executive is an
interested party, § 5.15 will govern review of the action. [d. § 6.01 cmt. a.
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If the corporation engages in a transaction in control, the Principles
state a preference, though not a requirement, for shareholder approval
of the transaction.I"
In contrast, the O.C.G.A. requires shareholder approval for any
mergers and share exchanges, whether or not the action is large enough
to affect control of the corporationr'" however, shareholders need not
approve the rejection or refusal to consider an offer. Shareholders must
also approve the sale of all or substantially all assets.?" In determin-
ing whether a sale is of all or substantially all the property, the Code
provides for a quantitative test:
Assets shall be deemed to be less than substantially all of a corpora-
tion's property if the fair value of the assets as of the date of the most
recent available financial information does not exceed two-thirds ofthe
fair value of all the assets of the corporation, and the annual revenues
of the corporation for the most recent fiscal year for which such
financial information is available represented or produced by such
assets do not exceed two-thirds of the total revenues of the corporation
for that period.I"
The O.C.G.A.,unlike the ALl Principles, allows issuance of securities
that would change control of the corporation without requiring share-
holder approval through the use of options to purchase beyond autho-
rized shares.I" Their primary use would be to defend against a
possible takeover.F" In addition, when there are authorized shares
which have not yet been issued, case law confirms the authority of the
board of directors to issue those shares without shareholder approv-
a1.321
315. Id. § 6.01(b). Approval by the shareholders is defined in § 1.02 to mean "approval
by a majority of the voting shares, unless a greater percentage is required by the
corporation's charter documents ... pursuant to" a subsequent sub-section § 1.02(b),which
requires any such provisions to require approval by the same percentage as will be
required by the provision. Id. § 1.02(b).
316. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-1101 to -1103 (1989); see also Carney, supra note 131.
317. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1202. This provision is an attempt to avoid the difficulty in
ascertaining which assets are sold in the usual course of business, the sale of which were
restricted in the old code. Carney, supra note 62, at 163.
318. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1201(b)(4) (1994).
319. Id. § 14-2-624(c) (1989); Carney, supra note 131, at 664.
320. Carney, supra note 131, at 663-64.
321. Tallant v. Executive Equities, Inc., 232 Ga. 807, 209 S.E.2d 159 (1974). In Tallant,
a majority shareholder objected to a new issue of securities, claiming that the objective of
the board of directors was to perpetuate its own position. Id. at 809, 209 S.E.2d at 160.
The court held that as long as the board offered valid business reasons for the issuance-in
this case to raise needed capital, and to broaden the base of shareholders-the transfer in
control was irrelevant unless there was "firm evidence that the transaction was
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B. Tender Offers
The ALl Principles define the term "unsolicited tender offer" to mean:
an offer to purchase or invitation to tender made to holders of voting
equity securities ... of a corporation, without the approval of the
corporation's board of directors, to effect a change in control ... of the
corporation by purchasing the holders' securities for cash, securities,
other consideration, or any combination thereof.322
The ALl Principles authorize a board of directors to take actions that
have the foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited tender offer as long
as the actions are a "reasonable response to the offer.,,323In consider-
ing whether the actions were a reasonable response to the offer, relevant
inquiries include the best interests of the corporation and the sharehold-
ers, as well as the interests of other constituents, provided that these
latter concerns do not "significantly disfavor the long-term interests of
shareholders.Y" Unlike the position taken in Delaware law,325
under the ALl Principles, the challenging party has the burden of
proving that the action was unreasonable.f"
The ALl Principles also provide separate "standards for review of
director action for purposes of injunctive relief on the one hand, and for
purposes of damages on the other;"327this separation is seen as central
to the approach taken in the Principles to hostile takeovers.F" Accord-
ingly, section 6.02(d) provides that an action taken by a board in
response to an unsolicited tender offer which is not reasonable may be
the basis for injunctive relief, but damages may be awarded against the
members of such a board only if their actions do not meet the standards
of the business judgment rule.329
The O.C.G.A. would appear to allow this type of transaction to be
evaluated under the general standards for director action.f"
This completes the review of Parts I through VI of the ALl Principles
compared with Georgia Law. A comparison of Part VII of the ALl
fraudulent." [d. at 810, 209 S.E.2d at 16l.
322. ALl PRINCIPLES,supra note 24, § 1.39.
323. [d. § 6.02(a).
324. [d. § 6.02(b).
325. [d. § 6.02 cmt. a (discussing Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985), and other cases).
326. [d.
327. [d. Part VI, Introductory Note (2).
328. [d.
329. [d. § 6.02(d).
330. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830 (1989); see also Eason, supra note 32.
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Principles, which deals with remedies, will appear in Mercer Law
Review's Annual Survey of Georgia Law next year.

